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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Survival of Actions-Alienation of Affections and Criminal
Conversation
In a recent North Carolina decision,' the court raised in a dictum2
the question whether or not an action for alienation of affections or for
criminal conversation would survive the death of the tort-feasor 8
It was the accepted view at common law that these actions were
personal actions and as such did not survive the death of either of the
parties thereto. 4 However, statutory modification of the common-law
rule has now been enacted in Great Britainu and in most of the states.0
It is therefore necessary to consider the survival statute of the particular
jurisdiction to determine whether or not a certain action will survive. In
North Carolina there are two statutes that must be construed to ascertain
whether actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation
survive. The first provides:
"§ 28-172. Action survives to and against representative.-
Upon the death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights
to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding, existing
in favor of or against such person, except as hereinafter provided,
shall survive to and against the executor, administrator or collector
of his estate."7
This statute was adopted in 1868,8 and has not been modified from that
date. The phrase "except as hereinafter provided" refers to the exceptions
which are included in the other relevant statute, which provides:
"§ 28-175. Actions which do not survive.-The following
rights of action do not survive:
"1. Causes of action for libel and slander, except slander of
title.
"2. Causes of action for false imprisonment and assault and
battery.
"3. Causes where the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or
granting it would be nugatory, after death."
'Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 88 S. E. 2d 96 (1955), 34 N. C. L. Ray.
362 (1956), affirming award to the plaintiff in action for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation. Appeal based on application of "dead man's statute":
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953).
'Hardison v. Gregory, supra note 1, at 331, 88 S. E. 2d at 101.
'The answer to the question of the court would also be determinative of the
abatement of these actions in North Carolina. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-74 (1953).
' Suskins v. Maryland Trust Co., 214 N. C. 347, 350, 199 S. E. 276, 278 (1938)(dictum) ; Mast v. Sapp, 140 N. C. 533, 53 S. E. 350 (1906) (dictum) ; PROSSER,
TORTs 706 (2d ed. 1955).
'PROSSER, Toas 707 (2d ed. 1955).
'Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Clains For
and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 969 (1931).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-172 (1950). 'N. C. Public Laws 1868-9, c. 113, § 98.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-175 (1950).
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This statute was also enacted in 1868 ;1o but, unlike G. S. § 28-172, there
has been a significant modification of this statute. In 1915 this statute
was amended to delete an additional provision to the effect that "other
injuries to the person, where such injury does not cause death of the
injured party,"'1 . shall not survive.
In its more recent cases the court has given little attention to these
statutes, assuming that nearly all actions survive unless they fall into the
specifically named categories of subsections one and two of G. S. § 28-
175. The writer's research has not uncovered any mention by the court
whatever of subsection three. The closest the court has come to dealing
with survival in this type of case is in Allen v. Baker,'2 which was decided
before 1915 and placed its major reliance on the phrase now deleted from
G. S. § 28-175. Because of precedent,' 3 the court felt constrained to hold
that an action for breach of promise to marry would survive the death
of the tort-feasor. However, the court indicated that as an original
construction of the statute it would have reached the opposite conclusion.
It thus is clear the actual case law of North Carolina gives no support
for answering the courts recent query as to the survival of these two
"heart balm" actions in the negative. Even the analogous dicta which can
be marshalled for the negative would appear to be based on an obsolete
statutory clause.
In raising the question the court cited various authorities which were
based on the law of other jurisdictions. 14 An analysis of these authorities
shows that the other jurisdictions are not in accord on the survival of
the actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. How-
ever, this divergence is due mainly to the variance in the survival statutes
themselves in the different jurisdictions. It is possible to classify the ap-
plication of the various survival statutes as to alienation of affections and
criminal conversation into three groups.
First: cases applying a statute which states affirmatively that actions
for "injuries to the person" or "damages to the person" will survive.
Construing such a phrase the courts generally hold that "personal injury"
does not include the two actions in question, and that there is no sur-
vival.15 This result is justified on two bases, both grounded on rules of
'o N. C. Public Laws 1868-9, c. 113, § 64.
"N. C. Public Laws 1915, c. 38; see Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332,
38 S. E. 2d 105 (1946) ; Note, Survival of Personal Injury Actions in North Caro-
lina, 25 N. C. L. REv. 84 (1946).
1286 N. C. 91 (1882).
"Shuler v. Millsaps' Executor, 71 N. C. 297 (1874).
1 C. J. S., Abatement and Revival § 147 (1936) ; 1 Am. Jum., Abatement and
Revival § 99 (1936) ; Annot., 14 A. L. R. 693 (1921), 24 A. L. R. 488 (1923), 57
A. L. R. 351 (1928) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-74 (1953) ; Suskins v. Maryland Trust
Co., 214 N. C. 347, 199 S. E. 276 (1938) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-175 (1950). The
citation order is that of the court.
"5 Howard v. Lunabury, 192 Wis. 507, 213 N. W. 301 (1927) ; But see Roberts
v. Turner, 49 Ga. App. 510, 176 S. E. 91 (1934) ; C. v. D., 10 ONT. L. R. 641 (1905).
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construction. (1) Since the provision allowing survival of personal
actions is in derogation of the common law, it is to receive a strict in-
terpretation; such an interpretation would limit the survival to those
personal injuries that may be classified as tangible or physical. 10 (2)
To allow these two intangible actions to survive would be to allow all
personal actions to survive; yet, since the legislature had not stated that
all personal actions were to survive, such a result should not be sanc-
tioned by the court.
Second: cases applying a statute which provides that all actions shall
survive except certain listed ones, which list includes the same phrase
"injuries to the person" or "damages to the person." North Carolina's
statute prior to the 1915 amendment was of this type. Paradoxically, in
these cases it is also held usually that the two causes of action do not
survive.1 Here, since the term denoting personal injuries is not used
in derogation of the common law, it is given its broad meaning and the
two actions are included.
Third: cases applying a statute which does not include the phrase
"injuries to the person" or any phrase of similar import as the criterion
for survival of the action or not. It would appear that under this type of
statute the actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation
would generally survive18 unless some other phrase excludes these actions
either expressly or by implication. 19
Thus it would appear that the authorities cited by the court turn on
the interpretation of a provision that no longer exists in the North
Carolina law. One possible basis for holding that actions for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation do survive under the present
North Carolina statute would be the invoking of the subjective third
subsection of G. S. § 28-175. Yet, the writer has been unable to dis-
cover any instance of the application of this provision by the court.
Although at the present time these two causes of action are in disfavor,20
1Tangible injuries are to be distinguished from intangible injuries, usually
classified as intangible injuries are those resulting from malicious prosecution, illegal
arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, slander, libel, alienation of affections,
seduction, criminal conversation, invasion of privacy and actions of similar character.Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Clahns For andAgainst Executors and Administrators, 29 MicH. L. Rxv. 969, 975 (1931).
" Hollett v. Wilmington Trust Co., 36 Del. (6 W. W. Harr.) 170, 172 Atl.763 (1934) ; White v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 140 Md. 593, 118 Atl. 177 (1922)(pointing out the dual construction given to the phrases "injury to the person" and
"damages to the person").
8 Powers v. Sumbler, 83 Ky. 526, 110 Pac. 97 (1910) ; Smith v. Brown, 17 Pa.
D. & C. 548 (1932).
9 Gross' Adm'r v. Lerford, 190 Ky. 526, 228 S. W. 24 (1921) (provision ex-
cepting criminal conversation from surviving extended to include action for aliena-
tion of affections) ; Justice v. Clinard, 142 Tenn. 208, 217 S. W. 663 (1919) (pro-
vision excepting "wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff" from surviving held
to include action for alienation of affectibns).2 Feinsinges, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MIcr. L. Ray. 979(1935) ; Kingsley, The Anti-Heart Bahn Statute, 13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 37 (1939).
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it would not appear that this would cause them to become "nugatory"
under the third subsection. Therefore, it is felt that when the court
examines the law on this subject in greater detail it would hold that
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation do survive.
HENRY W. CONNELLY
Tenancy in Common-Equitable Partition-One Cotenant's Attempt
to Devise or Convey a Specific Portion of Common Property
A point decided in the recent North Carolina case of Taylor v.
Taylor1 raised the question of the effect of one cotenant's purporting to
devise or convey an absolute interest in a specific quantity of the land
held in common. The decisions in this area are not numerous, and the
ones found seem to apply a particular rule to each differing fact situation.
Nevertheless, the cases would appear to be divisible into three logical
categories, and it is believed that certain fairly consistent principles lie
behind the results of the cases involving this question.
Purported Conveyance or Devise of the Whole of the Common Property
One of the most commonly encountered situations is that in which
one cotenant, who owns only an undivided interest in the land, attempts
to transfer by deed or will the entire interest in the whole tract held in
common. As to the effect of this, all the cases seem to be in accord.
The rule here is that the transferor conveys or devises his entire interest
in the property, which is his undivided interest in the whole tract de-
scribed.2
Purported Conveyance or Devise by Metes and Bounds of a Specific
Portion of the Common Property
Where one cotenant purports to transfer by metes and bounds a
specific portion of common property, there are two defects in the transac-
tion. First, the tenant attempts to transfer the entire fee in the land
described rather than his undivided interest in it. Second, the attempted
transfer of a specific portion of the undivided tract is in effect a unilateral
attempt to partition. Thus the courts do not ipso facto give effect to
such an attempted transfer. However, most of the states which have
passed on the question find such a transfer to be merely voidable at the
election of the grantor's cotenants; and only they can avoid it if, and to
the extent that, it prejudices them.3 This has been called the equitable
' 243 N. C. 726, 92 S. E. 2d 136 (1956).
-Devises: Spitzer v. Branning, 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516 (1939) ; Van Reuth v.
Mayor and City Council, 165 Md. 651, 170 At. 199 (1934) ; Lushington v. Sewell,
1 Russ. & M. 174, 39 Eng. Rep. 65 (1830). Deeds: Home Owners' Loan Corp.
v. Cilley, 125 S. W. 2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Bailey v. Howell, 209 N. C.
712, 716, 184 S. E. 476, 478 (1936) (dictum) (grantee of cotenant takes only
cotenant's share and steps into his shoes).
'Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 Fed. 465 (4th Cir. 1916); Lane v.
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